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Abstract
We consider a two-stage game with cost-reducing investments followed by a linear differentiated
Cournot duopoly. With competition inversely parameterized by the extent of product differentiation,
investment in the subgame perfect equilibrium is typically minimal for intermediate levels of
competition. Laboratory experiments partly confirm the U-shape in a reduced one-stage version of the
game. In the two-stage version, there is no evidence for positive effects of moving from intermediate to
intense competition.
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1 Introduction
A large game-theoretic literature deals with strategic investment decisions in
oligopolies. One important class of papers investigates the relation between
the intensity of competition and process innovation, typically using two-stage
games. This relation is generally regarded as ambiguous; depending on the
precise definition of competitive intensity and the particular oligopolistic en-
vironment, competition may have positive or negative eﬀects on investment
(Gilbert 2006; Schmutzler 2007; Vives 2008). In a general equilibrium set-
ting, it has been argued that an inverse U-shaped relation is also conceivable
(Aghion et al., 2005). This paper provides the surprising result that in a
simple partial equilibrium framework a direct (non-inverted) U-relation be-
tween competition and investment can emerge naturally, and it investigates
the claim in laboratory experiments.
In the first stage of our fairly standard model, duopolists choose cost-
reducing investments; in the second stage, they engage in diﬀerentiated
Cournot competition with linear inverse demand functions pi = a− qi − bqj,
where a > 0 and b ∈ [0, 1]. An increase in competition corresponds to a re-
duction in product diﬀerentiation (higher value of b). In the polar case b = 0
there are essentially two monopolies; b = 1 corresponds to a homogeneous
Cournot market.
For symmetric firms, that is, identical initial marginal costs, it turns
out that an increase in competition reduces investments as long as product
diﬀerentiation remains suﬃciently strong; as products become suﬃciently
similar, however, a further increase in competition raises investments. This
U-shape becomes even more pronounced for firms that are initially more
eﬃcient than the competitors. However, if a firm lags substantially behind
the competitor, increasing intensity of competition has an unambiguously
negative eﬀect on investments.
The paper is part of a larger research project that analyzes the eﬀects
of competition on innovation. The theoretical foundations and the economic
intuition for the project have been clarified in Schmutzler (2007), a paper
which shows what lies behind the ambiguous results on the relation between
competition and innovation in a general two-stage setting. It provides a
decomposition of the total eﬀect of competition on R&D investments into
four components which systematically go into diﬀerent directions. Applying
these general considerations to the specific model of the present paper, the
U-shape we identify comes from the interplay of two eﬀects: (i) the negative
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eﬀect that competition reduces profit margins and thereby the incentives to
increase equilibrium demand by lowering marginal costs, and (ii) the positive
eﬀect that competition increases the eﬀect of lower marginal costs on own
equilibrium demand. Of course, while the existence of these countervailing
eﬀects suggests the possibility of a non-monotone relationship, it does not
guarantee the U-shape. For this particular form of non-monotonicity, it is
important that profit margins turn out to be a convex function of the com-
petition parameter. Intuitively, as competition is intense, profits margins are
already quite small, so the adverse eﬀect of further competition on margins
(i) is small, and the positive eﬀect (ii) dominates.
In view of the large number of theoretical models that do not generate a
U-shaped relation between competition and investment and the clear intu-
ition for such ambiguity, we do not claim that we have exposed a general reg-
ularity. Rather, we want to highlight the theoretical possibility of a U-shaped
relation in a non-pathological setting. For the broader research agenda, the
existence of this possibility strongly reinforces the point that searching for a
general relation between competition and investment may be in vain. Rather,
it would appear more promising to identify the circumstances leading to each
kind of relation.
The most transparent way to provide empirical support for a result that
relies on a particular model of competition is to use a laboratory experiment.
We considered both symmetric and asymmetric settings. In both cases, we
compared the investments for weak competition (b = 1/10) to intermediate
competition (b = 2/3) and intense competition (b = 1). We also distin-
guished treatments where both stages of the game were played out from
treatments where only the first stage was played, and, for each combination
of investments, subjects obtained the payoﬀs of the Nash equilibrium of the
corresponding subgame. The latter simplified treatments provide some evi-
dence for the main prediction: In the symmetric case and for leaders in the
asymmetric case, investments are lowest for intermediate competition. How-
ever, in both cases, the positive eﬀect of moving from intermediate to intense
competition is insignificant. In the symmetric case, this reflects the fact that
there is overinvestment relative to the Nash equilibrium which is less pro-
nounced for b = 1 than for b = 2/3. In the asymmetric case, leaders invest
less than in the Nash equilibrium, but this eﬀect is stronger for b = 1. For
laggards, the predicted negative eﬀect of competition on investment holds,
but it is also less pronounced: Laggards overinvest, and more so for b = 1.
Partly, these observations reflect best responses to wrong beliefs that play-
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ers have about the investments of the other subjects. For laggards, however,
substantial overinvestment remains even after taking into account mistaken
beliefs. As investment imposes negative externalities on competitors, overin-
vestment may reflect social preferences: Laggards may deliberately overinvest
to hurt leaders which are exogenously in an advantageous position.
More substantial deviations from the theoretical predictions arise in the
two-stage treatments, where we only consider the symmetric cases with
b = 0.67 and b = 1. There, contrary to the one-stage treatments, sub-
jects underinvest both for intermediate and for intense competition. The
deviation is more pronounced for intense competition, so that moving from
intermediate to intense competition has no significant eﬀect on investments.
As to the second stage, for intense (but not for intermediate) competition,
the output tends to be lower than in equilibrium. Also, subjects do not gen-
erally respond to higher investments of competitors with lower own outputs,
contrary to predictions for subgame equilibria.
The observations can be jointly explained by reference to reciprocity and
eﬃciency concerns. Reciprocity implies that subjects respond to uncooper-
ative acts (high investments) by being uncooperative themselves (choosing
high outputs). Anticipating the existence of reciprocal subjects, even self-
ish subjects will choose low investments. Eﬃciency concerns help to explain
why the downward deviations in both stages are more pronounced for intense
competition: With intense competition, subjects can benefit more from col-
luding, that is, refraining from actions (high investments and outputs) that
impose negative externalities on competitors. Another explanation of the un-
derinvestment might be anticipated collusive behavior in the output stage:
If subjects expect to collude on low output levels in the future, they should
rationally reduce first-stage investments.1
While the theoretical analysis of oligopolistic investment models is well
established, the experimental analysis is still in its infancy. Except for two
early contributions of Isaac and Reynolds (1988, 1992) which deal with patent
races and show that an increase in competition in the sense of a larger number
of firms has a negative eﬀect on investments, most of the literature has only
developed recently. Moreover, to the extent that the literature deals with the
eﬀects of competition on investment, it considers only the role of the number
of firms and of switches from Cournot to Bertrand competition. Darai et al.
1For a related discussion of experimental evidence in two-stage investment games with
spillovers, see Goeree and Hinloopen (forthcoming).
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(2009) consider homogenous goods models with two and four firms. Con-
sistent with the earlier literature, they show that a larger number of firms
lowers investments for both Cournot and Bertrand competition, whereas in-
creasing competition in the sense of moving from Cournot to Bertrand has a
positive eﬀect on investments. Halbheer, Fehr, Götte and Schmutzler (2007)
also consider a Cournot investment game, but they do not deal with the ef-
fects of competition on investment. Instead, they ask whether investments
tend to increase pre-existing asymmetries between firms. As theory predicts,
this is indeed the case.2
Some papers consider related two stage games. For instance, Engelmann
and Normann (2007) consider the strategic trade policy model of Brander
and Spencer (1985). Like in our model, first-period actions (government
subsidies) are aggressive in that they induce second-period actions (higher
own firm outputs) that impose negative externalities on opponents, which
triggers desirable behavior of opponents because outputs are strategic sub-
stitutes. The experimental results are also similar in that first period-actions
are not as high as in equilibrium. Similar results are obtained by Huck et al.
(2004a) who consider the delegation game of Ferschtman and Judd (1987),
where firm owners can choose between output-based contracts and profit-
based contracts before letting managers take decisions. Finally, Oechssler
and Schuhmacher (2004) show that, in the setting of Brander-Lewis (1986)
Cournot duopolists use less debt than predicted.
Thus, our results for the two-stage game share with this literature the
observation that top-dog strategies appear to be considerably less impor-
tant than theory would predict in two stage games where the second-stage
has strategic substitutes. Compared to the literature, however, our analysis
makes an important additional contribution: By allowing for a clean compar-
ison of the two stage game with the reduced one-stage version where there is
overinvestment, we can provide evidence that the absence of overinvestment
in the two-stage game actually results from anticipated eﬀects on second-
period behavior.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 contains the model. Section 3 discusses
the experimental design. Sections 4 and 5 contain the results for the treat-
2Suetens (2005) deals with investments in a Cournot-Duopoly. Suetens (2008) considers
a R&D stage and a pricing stage to test whether R&D cooperation enhances price collusion.
She deals with two treatments (no vs. complete spillovers) and finds out that, in general,
prices are between the Nash equilibrium and the cooperative level. However, neither paper
deals with the eﬀects of increasing competition on investments.
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ments with one and two stages, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, firms i = 1, 2 with initial marginal
costs c0i > 0 simultaneously choose investments yi ∈ [0, c0i ), resulting in
marginal costs ci = c0i −yi.3 Investment costs are given by ky2i , where k > 0.4
In stage 2, firms simultaneously choose quantities, that is, they compete à la
Cournot. Suppose without loss of generality that c01 ≤ c02. If the inequality
holds strictly, then firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the laggard. Otherwise,
firms are symmetric. The inverse demand functions are given by
pi = a− qi − bqj, i 6= j, (1)
where a > 0 and b ∈ [0, 1]. For b = 0, equation (1) implies that both firms
are monopolists. The other polar case b = 1 corresponds to a homogenous
Cournot market. Thus, the higher b, the higher the intensity of competition.
From profit maximization, the equilibrium quantity of firm i in subgame
(ci, cj) is given by5
qi(ci, cj) =
2 (a− ci)− b (a− cj)
4− b2 . (2)
(2) implies the following profits in subgame (ci, cj):
Πi(ci, cj) =
µ
2 (a− ci)− b (a− cj)
4− b2
¶2
. (3)
Using (3), the net profit of firm i = 1, 2 is given by
πi(yi, yj) =
µ
2(a− c0i + yi)− b(a− c0j + yj)
4− b2
¶2
− ky2i , i 6= j. (4)
3We suppose both firms have zero fixed costs.
4Investments thus have a deterministic eﬀect. However, the results readily generalize to
a situation where risk-neutral firms invest into cost-reduction, but are successful with some
positive probability. A reduction in this probability has the same eﬀect on equilibrium
investments as an increase in investment costs.
5For the leader and symmetric firms, (2) is always positive; for the laggard, it is positive
as long as b < 2(a−c2)a−c1 .
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Maximization of (4) with respect to yi leads to
∂πi
∂yi
=
8 (a− c0i + yi)− 4b
¡
a− c0j + yj
¢
(4− b2)2
− 2kyi = 0. (5)
An important implication of this formula is that ∂
2πi
∂yi∂yj
< 0, so that reac-
tion functions with respect to competitor investments are downward-sloping
and the game satisfies strategic substitutes.6 ,7
From (5), equilibrium investments can be derived as:
y∗i =
(4 + 4b2k − 16k) (a− c0i ) + (8bk − 2b3k)
¡
a− c0j
¢
8k(4− b2)− k2 (4− b2)3 − 4
. (6)
For symmetric firms, the following simple result emerges.
Proposition 1 When c01 = c02, an increase in competition leads to a re-
duction in equilibrium investments y∗i , as long as b < 2/3. At b = 2/3,
investments are minimal. For b > 2/3, investments are increasing in b.
With asymmetric firms, such a general result is hard to obtain. However,
numerical calculations show that the U-shaped pattern survives for lead-
ers and for firms that are only slightly less eﬃcient than competitors. For
firms that lag far behind their competitors, however, the eﬀect of compe-
tition becomes unambiguously negative. For the parameters we use in the
experiment, these properties hold. Many other simulations provide analogous
results (Section 3.1). The appendix contains a general result that provides
strong intuitive support for the observations from the simulations: We show
that, for leaders and firms that are lagging behind only slightly, the rela-
tion between competition and the marginal investment incentives (
¯¯¯
∂Πi
∂ci
¯¯¯
) is
U-shaped, whereas it is negative for strong laggards. Though this does not
strictly speaking imply the corresponding statements on equilibrium invest-
ments, it works in this direction.8
6This property is very common in investment games without knowledge spillovers,
and it is unrelated to the fact that the second-stage Cournot games satisfies strategic
substitutes.
7Further, note that the second-order conditon is fulfilled if k > 4
(4−b2)2 .
8Schmutzler (2007) discusses these issues for general investment games. A positive
(negative) relation between competition and investment incentives means that the para-
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The U-shape reflects the interaction of two countervailing eﬀects.9 First,
in the diﬀerentiated Cournot model, as in most reasonable cases, increasing
competition has a negative eﬀect on the profit margin pi− ci that a firm can
command in equilibrium. Hence, the positive eﬀect on equilibrium demand
that comes from a cost-reducing investment is less valuable. This points to
a negative eﬀect of competition on marginal investment incentives. How-
ever, as competition increases, the positive eﬀect of increasing eﬃciency on a
firm’s demand becomes more pronounced, suggesting a positive relation be-
tween competition and marginal investment incentives. The non-monotone
relationship between competition and investment reflects the interaction of
these two eﬀects. Specifically, the driving force behind the U-shape is the
fact that the profit margin is a convex function of the competition parame-
ter. Hence, the negative eﬀect of competition on margins is less pronounced
when competition is already intense, and the positive eﬀect dominates.
To understand the diﬀerence between leaders and laggards, note that,
while both eﬀects are still present for strong laggards, the positive eﬀect
becomes small for a firm that is much less eﬃcient than the competitor: It
has a much lower profit margin, so that it benefits much less from an increase
in demand. When the firm becomes so ineﬃcient that it barely survives in
the market (the profit margin approaches zero), the gain from increasing
demand approaches zero.
For the sake of completeness, we mention the following well-known result.
Proposition 2 If c01 < c02, then y1 > y2.
The result follows from (6), using the second-order condition. It actually
holds for more general investment models. This follows from Theorem 1 in
Athey and Schmutzler (2001), which gives general conditions for games with
strategic substitutes guaranteeing that one firm invests more than another
one. Intuitively, because ∂
2πi
∂yi∂c0i
< 0 firms with lower initial costs have greater
investment incentives. Because of the strategic-substitutes property ∂
2πi
∂yi∂yj
<
meter shifts reaction curves outwards (inwards), suggesting higher (lower) investments.
However, when (i) investments are strategic substitutes and (ii) firms are initially asym-
metric, there is not necessarily a one-to-one relation between eﬀect on marginal investment
incentives and on equilibrium eﬀects.
9When investment incentives are increasing in the competition parameter, investments
in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game are also increasing under fairly weak
additional conditions (see Schmutzler, 2007).
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0, these eﬀects are mutually reinforcing: If a competitor invests more, this
has an additional negative eﬀect on own investments.10
Finally, we briefly compare the results of this section to those of a model
with price competition, which is otherwise unchanged. With price competi-
tion, the U-shaped relation only holds for strong leaders; for symmetric firms
and laggards, it becomes negative. It is also still true that leaders always
invest more than laggards. 11
3 The Experiment
3.1 Choosing the Parameters
In the experiment, we choose a = 50, k = 1. For the symmetric case, we set
c01 = c02 = 21; for the asymmetric case, c01 = 21; c02 = 25. Figure 1 plots the
equilibrium investments for all b ∈ [0, 1]. As argued in Section 2, there is a
U-shaped relation between the intensity of competition and investments for
leaders and symmetric firms, whereas competition has a negative eﬀect for
the laggard. The pattern holds much more generally.12
We restricted investment choices to yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 14}. We considered
three values of b, which correspond to diﬀerent intensities of competition: b =
1/10 (weak), b = 2/3 (intermediate), and b = 1 (intense). Thus, according
to Figure 1 an increase of competition from weak to intermediate leads to a
reduction of investments in all cases, whereas an increase from intermediate
to intense competition only increases the investments of symmetric firms and
leaders.13 The predicted equilibria for our parameter values are summarized
10However, an important countervailing eﬀect would be introduced by generalizing the
cost function toK(yi, c0i ), such that marginal investments costs are decreasing in c
0
i . Then,
even though investments are more rewarding for leaders, they are less costly for laggards,
and it is no longer clear who invests more. However, this modification does not aﬀect the
eﬀects of competition on investments, as long as cost functions are independent of θ.
11See Schmutzler (2007) for more details and for an intuitive discussion of the diﬀerences.
12For instance, the same qualitative picture emerges for all combinations of a, c01 and c
0
2
where a− c01 = 29 for the leader and a− c0j ∈ {21, ..., 28} for the laggard. A U-shape for
the laggard requires the laggard to be even closer to the leader than a− c0j = 28.
13Of course, these qualitative properties could have been obtained by other choices of b.
Our choice was guided by two considerations. First, we wanted to choose parameters so
as to maximize the distance between predicted investments in the low and intermediate
competition case as well as in the intense and intermediate cases. In itself, this would have
led to parameters b = 0, b = 2/3, and b = 1. Second, however, we wanted to avoid the
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Figure 1: Equilibrium investments
in the Table 1.
Cost Structure Predictions
own costs competitor costs b = 0.1 b = 0.67 b = 1
21 21 9.09 7.75 8.29
21 25 9.18 8.69 11.71
25 21 7.75 5.75 3.71
Table 1: Equilibrium investment predictions
In a first set of treatments, we did not model the product market stage
explicitly. Instead, for each investment profile, players earned the unique
Nash equilibrium profits of the corresponding subgame, net of investment
cost. This was a deliberate modeling choice ensuring that, whatever devia-
tions from the equilibrium investments might arise, they do not result from
anticipated second-period deviations from the product market equilibrium.
Nevertheless, for the symmetric case and b = 2/3 and b = 1, we also consid-
ered a full version of the game where both stages were played out explicitly.
In this case, outputs were chosen from qi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 19}.
pure monopoly case b = 0 to make the weak competition treatments at least somewhat
interesting for subjects as well as outside observers. We therefore chose b = 0.1 instead.
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3.2 Procedures
We conducted ten sessions at the University of Zurich; see Table 2.14 Each
session had 20 periods, with a switch of the competition parameter after pe-
riod 10. In diﬀerent sessions, we reversed the order of the parameterizations
to allow for sequencing eﬀects. Eight sessions dealt with the reduced one-
stage version of the game. In the asymmetric sessions, the roles of leader
and laggard were randomly assigned and there was no switch over the 20
periods. Sessions S1-S4 implemented the symmetric case; A1-A4 dealt with
the asymmetric case. Sessions S5 and S6 implemented symmetric two-stage
treatments.
Symmetric/Asymmetric Period 1-10 Period 11-20 Stages
S1/A1 b = 0.1 b = 0.67 1
S2/A2 b = 0.67 b = 0.1 1
S3/A3 b = 0.67 b = 1 1
S4/A4 b = 1 b = 0.67 1
S5 b = 0.67 b = 1 2
S6 b = 1 b = 0.67 2
Table 2: Six symmetric and four asymmetric sessions.
We formed fixed matching groups with 6 players each. The participants
were randomly matched into groups of size two within the matching groups.15
At the end of each period, subjects learned the investment level of the other
group member and their own net profit for that period. Moreover, in each
period, subjects were asked to give a belief about the investment of the other
group member.
In each session, participants received an initial endowment of CHF 20
(≈EUR 12). Average earnings including the endowment were CHF 38 (≈EUR
24) for S1 and S2, and CHF 30 (≈EUR 19) for S3 and S4. In A1 and A2, av-
erage earnings were CHF 40 (≈EUR 25) and CHF 32 (≈EUR 20) for leaders
14The sessions took place in 2007 and 2008. Participants were undergraduate students.
We did not exclude any disciplines. In eight of the ten sessions, there were 36 subjects.
In S3 and S6, there were 30 participants. Sessions lasted about 2 hours each. No subject
participated in more than one session. The experiment was programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
15Consistent with a wide-spread practice, subjects were informed that they were not
matched with the same player in each period, but they were not informed about the size
of the matching group.
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Figure 2: S1-S4: Investments in Periods 1-10
and laggards, respectively. In A3 and A4, leaders earned on average CHF
35 (≈EUR 22); laggards CHF 24 (≈EUR 15). For both S5 and S6, average
earnings including the endowment were CHF 30 (≈EUR 19).
4 Results for the one-stage treatments
4.1 The Symmetric Setting
Figure 2 depicts average investments in the first ten periods of S1-S4 for the
diﬀerent parameter values. While it confirms the U-shape, it reveals that
there is overinvestment for all values of b.
The figure also addresses a potential explanation for overinvestment,
namely that investments are best responses to mistaken beliefs. If subjects
believe that their group members invest less than the equilibrium, then, with
strategic substitutes, optimal responses to these beliefs would involve over-
investment relative to the equilibrium. Indeed, for b = 1, mean investments
essentially coincide with the best response to the underestimated beliefs.16
16Average beliefs are approximately 8.7 for b = 1, whereas the equilibrium is 9.09.
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Figure 3: S1-S4: Investments in Periods 11-20
However, we have no explanation for why subjects are underestimating in-
vestments. Also, for b = 0.1 and b = 0.67, there is essentially no diﬀerence
between equilibrium investments and best responses to beliefs, so that the
overinvestment must have other sources. In the last ten periods, for weak
and intermediate competition, Figure 3 indicates overinvestment; for intense
competition, there is slight underinvestment. In this case, mean investments
diﬀer substantially from best responses to beliefs for all values of b.
To test how strong the eﬀects of competition in treatments S1-S4 are, we
consider the following OLS model:
yit = β0 + β1δ
i
weak + β2δ
i
intense + e
i
t, (7)
where yit is the investment of subject i in period t; eit is a residual term.
The dummy variable δiweak takes the value 1 if b = 0.1. Otherwise, it takes
the value 0. Similarly, δiintense takes the value 1 if and only if b = 1. Estimates
are shown in Table 3. Here and in the following regressions, standard errors
are corrected for matching group clusters.
Both for periods 1 to 10 and for periods 11 to 20, the coeﬃcient weak is
positive and significant at the 1%-level. The coeﬃcient intense is positive,
12
Period 1-10 Period 11-20
investment investment
const 8.3591∗∗∗ 8.0917∗∗∗
(0.1906) (0.1407)
weak 1.1076∗∗∗ 1.4667∗∗∗
(0.2199) (0.3199)
intense 0.3437 0.1050
(0.4485) (0.2016)
N 1380 1380
R2 0.03715 0.09207
Note: OLS regression with standard errors
corrected for matching group clusters in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Eﬀects of the intensity of competition on the investment behavior.
but not significant.17
A similar OLS model, with the independent variables as in (7), but invest-
ment yit replaced by overinvestment∆it ≡ yit−y∗i , can be estimated to capture
the size and significance of overinvestment. Overinvestment is significant at
the 1%-level in both period ranges.18 Summing up, we obtain:
Result 1 In S1-S4, there is substantial overinvestment. Investments are low-
est for intermediate competition, but the positive eﬀect of intense competition
on investment is insignificant.
4.2 The Asymmetric Setting
In the asymmetric case, we obtain evidence for the main comparative-statics
predictions, but, as in the symmetric case, there are notable deviations from
equilibrium and substantial diﬀerences between early and late periods.
Figure 4 considers the first ten periods. For leaders, there is underinvest-
ment when competition is intense (b = 1); for laggards, there is overinvest-
17Inclusion of blocked period dummies for the first and second half of the respective
periods does not change anything substantial; these dummies are not significant. Also,
the coeﬃcient remains insignificant if the investments of all 20 periods are considered.
18The constant coeﬃcients are 0.609 (0.342) for periods 1-10 (11-20).
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Figure 4: A1-A4: Investments in Periods 1-10
ment when competition is intermediate and intense (b = 0.67, b = 1). Even
so, the diﬀerence between leaders and laggards remains highly significant.
These deviations from the equilibrium are related to mistaken beliefs
about other players’ actions. Leaders believe that laggards invest more than
they actually do and thus more than in equilibrium (Figure 5). Given their
mistaken beliefs, leaders essentially choose the optimal investment level.19
For laggards such reasoning can only partly explain the deviations from equi-
librium. Laggards believe that leaders invest less than they do and hence
less than in equilibrium, but their investments are even higher than the best
response to the wrong beliefs. One explanation may be that laggards de-
liberately hurt leaders who have an exogenous advantage, reflecting social
preferences.
In periods 11-20, leaders also invest more than laggards (Figure 6). More-
over, for leaders, there is slight overinvestment when competition is weak and
intermediate, and substantial underinvestment for intense competition. For
laggards, there is overinvestment for all values of b.
Figure 7 reveals that, for b = 1, leaders believe that laggards invest more
19Recall that own investments and beliefs about other players’ investments are strategic
substitutes, so that overestimation of competitor’s investments leads to underinvestment.
14
Figure 5: A1-A4: Investments and beliefs in Periods 1-10
Figure 6: A1-A4: Investments in Periods 11-20
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Figure 7: A1-A4: Investments and beliefs in periods 11-20
than they actually do and thus more than in equilibrium. However, this does
not fully explain the underinvestment behavior. Investments of leaders are
even lower than the best response to the own overestimated beliefs. Further,
for laggards, the overinvestment corresponds to an underestimation of lead-
ers’ investments. Like in the first ten periods, laggards invest even more than
the best response to the wrong beliefs.
To test how strong the U-shaped relation is, we consider the OLS model
given by (7) for leaders and laggards separately. Estimates are shown in
Table 4. First, consider leaders. Both for periods 1 to 10 and for 11-20,
the coeﬃcients related to weak and intense are positive. However, the only
significant relation is for intense in periods 1-10.
Second, consider laggards. The negative eﬀect of moving from weak to
intermediate competition is substantial and significant in each period range,
whereas the eﬀects of moving from intermediate to intense competition are
only significant (at the 10%-level) for early periods.20
We summarize our results as follows.
20Again, blocked period dummies are not significant. Also, the OLS model (7) can be
adapted to test for over- and underinvestment. It turns out that the overinvestment of
laggards is significant at the 1%-level, whereas the underinvestment of the leader is not
significant.
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Leader Laggard
Period 1-10 Period 11-20 Period 1-10 Period 11-20
investment investment investment investment
const 8.5944∗∗∗ 8.8972∗∗∗ 7.0333∗∗∗ 6.4417∗∗∗
(0.1956) (0.2598) (0.2743) (0.2181)
weak 0.6611 0.4361 0.7944∗ 2.1417∗∗
(0.4101) (0.3046) (0.3243) (0.5430)
intense 1.7667∗∗∗ 0.5028 -1.2722 -0.8194
(0.3044) (0.4924) (0.6416) (0.5653)
N 720 720 720 720
R2 0.09467 0.01125 0.08508 0.1759
Note: OLS regression with standard errors corrected for matching group
clusters in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Eﬀects of the intensity of competition on the investment behavior.
Result 2 In treatments (A1)-(A4), we observe the following qualitative re-
sults, some of which are significant: (a) Leaders invest more than laggards.
(b) Leaders’ investments are lowest for intermediate competition, though the
relation is not significant in all cases. (c) Laggards’ investments strictly de-
crease with increasing intensity of competition.
A final comment on the partial non-significance of the positive eﬀects
of increasing competition is in order. The predicted positive eﬀect of more
intense competition on investment is fairly small in percentage terms. The
lack of significance of the intense competition dummy, both in the symmetric
and in the asymmetric treatments, may reflect this fact.
5 Results for the two-stage treatments
5.1 Investments
The one-stage approach is useful because it identifies deviations from the
equilibrium of the investment game that, by definition, cannot result from
expected deviations in the output game. However, the next result shows
that this simplification is not innocuous: Once one allows for the possibility
of such deviations, first-period behavior changes massively.
Result 3 Under both intense and intermediate competition, mean invest-
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Figure 8: One stage vs. two stages: Mean investments for b = 1
ments are lower than in the one-stage treatments.
Figures 8 and 9 show that investments in the two-stage treatments are
lower in the subgame perfect equilibrium, which on average lies below the
investments in the one-stage treatments.21
In the one-stage experiment, this increase of b from 0.67 to 1 has a positive
eﬀect on investments. However, the two-stage experiment does not yield the
same result.
Result 4 In S5 and S6, higher intensity of competition does not increase
investments.
Comparison of Figures 8 and 9 that, for the two intensities of competition,
investments are close. Contrary to the prediction, they are higher for b = 0.67
than for b = 1, in particular, in late periods.22
21We test the results with an OLS-regression over a second-stage dummy and with a
Wilcoxon test. For periods 1-10, the average eﬀect of the second-stage dummy is −1.94 for
b = 1 and −1.84 for b = 0.67. For periods 11-20, the corresponding coeﬃcients are −1.61
and −1.51. All results are significant at the 1%-level, with standard errors corrected for
matching group clusters. The Wilcoxon test yields significance only for b = 1, however.
22Over all periods and subjects, the mean investment is 6.87 (6.56 ) for b = 0.67 (1).
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Figure 9: One stage vs. two stages: Mean investments for b = 0.67
5.2 Output stage
The output stage is interesting in its own right. As players typically choose
diﬀerent investments in stage 1, the second-stage game endogenously becomes
an asymmetric duopoly. Experimental investigations of asymmetric Cournot
duopolies are rare (Mason et al. 1992, Mason and Phillips 1997). Contrary to
the corresponding symmetric duopoly games (Huck et al. 2004b), they tend
to reveal outputs above the equilibrium. Using (2), we obtain the following
predictions for fixed values of b.
1. Subgame equilibrium outputs are increasing in own investments.
2. Subgame equilibrium outputs are decreasing in competitor investments.
3. For symmetric subgames, equilibrium outputs are increasing in total
investments.
Intuitively, the first two results arise because own cost reductions shift
reaction functions in the output diagram outwards, whereas competitor cost
reductions shift them inwards. The third result states that the own eﬀect
dominates over the cross eﬀect. To substantiate the last claim, note that
average subgame equilibrium outputs are q(y¯) ≡ (a−c0+y¯)
2+b for c
0 ≡ c01 = c02.
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Figure 10: S5-S6: Outputs and beliefs for b = 1
5.2.1 Intense competition
For b = 1, Figure 10 gives an overview of the observations. The horizontal
line denotes the outputs in the subgame perfect equilibrium. The dotted line
is a useful reference case. It reflects average outputs q(y¯t) in any subgame
equilibrium corresponding to the average investments y¯t of the period under
consideration. Because actual investments are below subgame perfect equilib-
rium investments, q(y¯t) is typically below the subgame equilibrium outputs.
Actual outputs are usually even below this reference level, which is clearly
not in line with the above-mentioned findings of Mason et al. (1992), Mason
and Phillips (1997) according to which outputs tend to be above equilibrium.
Next, consider the relation between investments and outputs at the indi-
vidual level. For output levels xit, and investments yit, y
j
t , j 6= i, and a dummy
δit if t belongs to the first five periods under consideration, we considered an
OLS-regression
xit = β0 + β1y
i
t + β2y
j
t + β3δ
i
t + e
i
t, (8)
with standard errors corrected for matching group clusters.
Table 5 shows that the relation between own investments and outputs is
positive as predicted. Further, in periods 1-10, there is a negative relation
between the competitor’s investments and own outputs, which is significant
20
at the 10%-level. However, the predicted negative relation does not arise in
late periods. The coeﬃcent is essentially zero.
Intermediate competition Intense competition
Period 1-10 Period 11-20 Period 1-10 Period 11-20
output output output output
const 9.1173∗∗∗ 10.179∗∗∗ 8.2878∗∗ 9.0106∗∗∗
(1.0389) (0.9205) (1.8269) (1.0216)
own inv 0.5187∗∗∗ 0.7100∗∗ 0.6320 ∗ 0.4769∗∗
(0.1265) (0.1963) (0.2326) (0.1486)
inv other 0.06865 -0.1227 -0.1500∗ -0.0004275
(0.1064) (0.1283) (0.06523) (0.1105)
period 1-5 -0.9936∗∗ -0.7201
(0.3611) (0.4946)
period 11-15 -1.2354∗∗ -0.5312∗∗
(0.2880) (0.1610)
N 360 300 300 360
R2 0.1336 0.2537 0.1527 0.1078
Note: OLS regression with standard errors corrected for matching group
clusters in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Eﬀects of the intensity of competition on output behavior.
5.2.2 Intermediate competition
Figure 11 reveals a diﬀerent situation for intermediate competition. Average
outputs are closer to the equilibrium outputs in most periods, and even
higher in the final periods. Also, the subgame equilibrium outputs q(y¯)
corresponding to observed investments are very close to actual outputs.
Contrary to the case of intense competition, downward deviations from
equilibrium outputs therefore tend to be less pronounced for intermediate
competition where the negative externalities resulting from the other play-
ers are weaker than for intense competition. Outputs are lower for more
intense competition than for intermediate competition, which is consistent
with equilibrium predictions.
Table 5 also shows that output increases in own investments in both
early and late rounds, as predicted, but the eﬀect of other investment is not
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Figure 11: S5-S6: Outputs and beliefs in the two-stage treatments
significantly diﬀerent from zero.
5.3 Towards an explanation
In the two-stage treatments, several interesting results emerge.
1. Contrary to the one-stage treatments, there is underinvestment relative
to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
2. While the reaction of outputs to own investments is consistent with
subgame equilibrium behavior, there is generally no significant negative
eﬀect of competitor investments on own outputs.
3. Because underinvestment is more pronounced for intense competition,
the predicted positive eﬀect of moving from intermediate to intense
competition is not observed.
4. Output is lower than in the SPE (and even in the subgame equilibria
corresponding to the observed low investments) for intense competition,
but not for intermediate competition.
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To interpret these results, arguments based on social preferences are help-
ful. Underinvestment is cooperative behavior (with the firms as a reference
group), because investments involve negative externalities. Hence, reciprocal
behavior in the output stage would suggest a positive relation between own
investments and competitor outputs rather than the negative eﬀect suggested
by theory. Thus, reciprocal output choices may imply that the strategic in-
centive to invest is smaller than predicted by theory. The “Top-Dog” logic
that aggressive cost reductions induce desired behavior of the competitor
(output reductions) no longer holds in the presence of reciprocity or is at
least weakened, because reciprocal subjects may respond to aggressive in-
vestments with output increases rather than reductions.
These reciprocity-based arguments are consistent with observations 1 and
2, but they have nothing to say about observations 3 and 4. These observa-
tions point to systematic diﬀerences between intermediate and intense com-
petition both in the output and in the investment stage. These diﬀerences are
related: The downward output deviations in the intense competition case fit
well with downward deviations in investments: If expected outputs are low,
so should cost-reducing investments be; conversely, if investments are low,
optimal outputs are low. To explain why there is a stronger tendency for
both activities to lie below the equilibrium in the intense competition case
than in the intermediate competition case, eﬃciency considerations might
play a role: Equilibrium outputs and investments are both excessive from
the perspective of joint profit maximization, so that refraining from these
activities increases joint payoﬀs. As increasing competition increases the
benefits of such collusive activities, one expects them to be more important
fo b = 1 than for b = 0.67. This is consistent with subjects underinvesting
more substantially for intense than for intermediate competition. A puzzle
with this explanation arises when it is contrasted with the one-stage games.
The one-stage investment game is very similar to a standard Cournot out-
put game; in particular, it involves negative externalities. It is thus unclear
why subjects collude in the output game, but not in the qualitatively similar
one-stage investment game.
6 Conclusion
We considered a simple two-stage model where there is a U-shaped relation
between competition and investment, except for firms that are initially much
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less eﬃcient than competitors. In the one-stage treatments, where subjects
only take investment decisions, there is overinvestment for both intermediate
and intense competition. As predicted, however, an increase in competition
yields higher investments; though the eﬀect is not always significant. Interest-
ingly, the two-stage experiment, where subjects take investment and output
decisions, does not support the one-stage results. For both intermediate and
intense competition, there is underinvestment; further, an increase in com-
petition does not lead to higher investments. The deviations from first-stage
equilibrium investments seem related to deviations in second-stage outputs.
In particular, in the intense competition case, subjects choose outputs below
the equilibrium level, which correspond to relatively low investments. Both
considerations of reciprocity and joint payoﬀ maximization appear to play a
role in explaining the deviations from predictions.
The substantial diﬀerences between the one-stage and two-stage treat-
ments suggests an interesting avenue for future research. Is it possible to
understand more generally how the behavior of subjects in simplified one-
stage treatments diﬀers from the behavior in the full two-stage game? This
would be interesting, because simplicity of design is useful to understand the
behavior of subjects in the laboratory. It would therefore be important to
understand what the price of the simplification is.
7 Appendix
We provide a general result about the relation between competition b and
marginal investment incentives,
¯¯¯
∂Πi
∂ci
¯¯¯
, which is captured by
∂2Πi
∂ci∂b
=
(16 + 12b2) (a− cj)− 32b (a− ci)
(4− b2)3
. (9)
The result shows that there is a U-shaped relation for the leader and firms
that are only lagging behind slightly. Investigation of (9) yields Proposition
1, using Y 0i ≡ a− c0i .
Proposition 3 Suppose 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a. Then, the
following holds: (i) For the leader, there is a U-shaped relation between the
intensity of competition and marginal incentives to invest, with the minimum
at 0 < b ≤ 2
3
. (ii) For the laggard, there is a U-shaped relation with the
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minimum at 2
3
≤ b ≤ 1 if Y
0
1
Y 02
≤ 8
7
. (iii) If Y
0
1
Y 02
> 8
7
, the marginal incentives
for the laggard are strictly decreasing. (iv) For symmetric firms, there is a
U-shaped relation with the minimum at b = 2
3
.
Proof. By (9), if 2
3
< b ≤ 1 and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a, then ∂
2Π1
∂c1∂b
< 0. Further,
(9) has a unique zero bˆ ∈ (0, 2
3
], given by
bˆ =
4− 2
p
−3Q2 + 4
3Q
, (10)
where Q = Y
0
2
Y 01
≤ 1. For Q2 < 4
3
, bˆ is well-defined. If Y
0
2
Y 01
→ 1, then bˆ → 2
3
.
If 0 ≤ b < 2
3
and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a, then ∂
2Π2
∂c2∂b
> 0. Further, ∂
2Π2
∂c2∂b
has a
unique zero b˜ ∈
£
2
3
, 1
¤
. b˜ is given by (10), where Q = Y
0
1
Y 02
. By Q2 ≤ 4
3
, b˜ is
well-defined. By Q2 ≤ 64
49
, b˜ ∈ [0, 1] . If 64
49
< Q2 ≤ 4
3
, then b˜ ∈ (1, 2√
3
]. If
Q2 > 4
3
, there is no b˜. This yields statements (i) to (iv).
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